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Temporalités et perceptions de la séparation entre Israéliens et Palestiniens
Cédric Parizot
1 At the end of the 2000s, the separation between Israelis and Palestinians was considered
complete. In Gaza, the Israeli withdrawal of 2005 and the sealing off of the coastal strip
brought an end to movement between this area and Israel. In the West Bank, the Israelis
consider the construction of the “security barrier”1, begun in 2002, a definitive means of
enabling the erection of a rampart against Palestinian suicide attacks and the marking of
a border between the two populations (Rabinowitz 2003, Parizot 2009). The Palestinians,
for their part, stress the confinement imposed on them in the West Bank enclaves and the
impossibility of entering Israel without a permit. Everything leads us to believe that an
impenetrable border now separates two distinct spaces, one Israeli and one Palestinian. 
2 This view has, however, been qualified by studies conducted on the policy of separation
and the way it operates on the ground. Researchers have stressed that this policy has not
led to the emergence of a Westphalian border between the Israeli and the Palestinian
space, such as those which separate modern states. In respect of the West Bank, these
studies demonstrate that the inter-connection between Palestinian and Israeli zones is so
strong  that  a  geographic  separation  between  two  contiguous  territories  is  today
impossible  (Azulay  and  Ophir  2008).  In  this  context,  the  restrictions  of  movement
imposed on the  Palestinians  of  the  West Bank,  the  construction of  the  wall  and the
deployment of obstacles and control mechanisms help to compensate for the degree of
inter-connection between these zones, while reinforcing the Israeli occupation. 
3 Therefore the policy of separation, instituted by Israel in the years 1990 and 2000, has
created complex territorial configurations.  It  has created a reality where cohabit two
types of spaces: on the one hand, a continuous, fluid Israeli space, in which it is possible
to travel  quickly and,  on the other hand,  a fragmented Palestinian space,  lined with
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obstacles,  in which movement is  slow and where routes are unpredictable (Weizman
2007, Petti 2008). By rendering the movement of Israelis fluid, while slowing down that of
the Palestinians, the Israeli control mechanisms are subjecting the two populations to
two distinct time regimes. In this context, the space/time relationships and practices of
the two populations are radically asymmetric (Collins 2009, Handel 2009, Petti 2008). Ariel
Handel suggests viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no longer solely as a territorial
conflict,  but  as  a  conflict  structured  around  the  use  of  space  (Handel  2009).  These
approaches  are  particularly  interesting  in  that  they  underline  not  only  the  spatial
dimension,  but  also  the  temporal  dimension  of  the  separation  between  Israelis  and
Palestinians. 
4 These  studies,  however,  were  anchored  in  a  too  binary  approach  towards  Israeli-
Palestinian spaces  and temporalities.  Hence,  they tend to  re-introduce  the  idea  of  a
completed separation between two realities. A binary approach to space and to space/
time practices cancels or prevents the analysis of an ensemble of intermediary situations.
For example, in the West Bank, while the restrictions of movement aim to separate the
spaces  of  movement  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians,  they  are  not  completely
successful.  They leave numerous intermediary zones where the two populations cross
each other on a daily basis. In addition, this binary model does not take into account the
experiences and space/time practices of populations who possess a status that differs
from Israeli  Jews and from the Palestinians of the West Bank. This is the case of the
Palestinians of Israel2, who due to their citizenship can move around like other Israelis,
but  because  of  their ethnic  affiliation,  are  subjected  to  a  different  treatment  at
checkpoints and therefore find themselves incorporated within another time flow. This is
also the case of the Palestinians of Jerusalem. 
5 I attempt, through an ethnographic study of the practices of three populations (Israeli
Jews, Palestinians of Israel and Palestinians of the West Bank), to reconsider the role of
the policy of separation and the temporal dimensions of this mechanism. I analyze the
way in which the policy of separation has distinctly affected the space/time practices of
these  groups  in  the  course  of  the  2000s  and  thus  contributed  to  readjusting  their
perceptions of the separation and of the Other. The study of the subjectivities created by
space practices is unavoidable in order to understand the way the policy of separation
operates and the spaces it has generated. First of all, as emphasized by Michel de Certeau
(1990,  173),  there  is  no  space  unless  one  “takes  into  account  vectors  of  direction,
quantities  of  speed  and  the  time  variable  […],  [space]  is  in  a  way  animated  by  the
ensemble of movements deployed within it. […] Space is a lived-in place. Thus a street
which is geometrically defined by urbanism is transformed into space by pedestrians.” In
this sense,  the territorial  configurations defined by the policy of separation can only
emerge as spaces if we take into account the practices of ordinary actors. 
6 The  analysis  of  the  subjectivities,  created  by  these  practices,  will  then enable  us  to
understand how, at the end of the 2000s, Israelis and Palestinians view and comprehend
the separation. I shall strive, in particular, to identify the mechanisms by which these
populations construct the image of a discreet separation. Like Akhil Gupta and James
Ferguson (1992), I shall try to understand the processes by which these ordinary actors
construct  the  discontinuity  and  differentiation  between  their  respective  spaces  in  a
context  in  which  they  remain,  nonetheless,  greatly  interconnected.  Finally,  an
examination  of  these  subjectivities  is  essential  in  order  to  put  into  perspective  the
differences  that  prevail  in  the  representations  of  space  between one population and
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another. In order to avoid the trap of a binary approach, I have abandoned the concept of
space/time “asymmetry” and substituted instead that of “foliation.” (feuilletage).
7 I shall show how, by superimposing themselves, these perceptions favor a “foliation” of
representations  of  space  which  corresponds  to  the  hierarchies  produced  by  the
subjection of the different populations to different time regimes. Finally, this foliation
demonstrates the need to surpass the compartmentation that prevails between research
on Israel and research on Palestine. An approach limited to one or the other side would
not have enabled the identification of this process. To do so, one must view these spaces
as an integral part of an Israeli-Palestinian whole.
8 The data, on which my research is based, was collected between 1996 and 2009 and does
not derive from systematic interviews. It proceeds more from observation and a flowing
form of  listening  suitable  to  the  ethnography,  and from the  repeated  experience  of
crossing Israeli-Palestinian spaces. The interview technique alone would not have been
sufficient to gather the necessary data for the formulation of this study. The study of
perceptions of space/time is based both on narratives collected from a sample of actors,
and on practices which these actors are not always conscious of. It also aims to evaluate
and  document  the  rapid  transformations  of  space  which  these  people  forget  or
reconstruct  often  according  to  current  contexts.  This  form of  flowing  listening  and
observation was deployed in the course of my journey which led me to immerse myself
among the different populations whose patterns of movement I present: first of all, in the
course of  my research with the Bedouins of  the Negev in the Hûra and Rahat areas
(1996-1999), then while residing in Tel Aviv (1999-2002) and in Beer Sheva (20002-2004) in
the heart  of  Jewish Israeli  populations and,  finally,  through my research in the field
among  the  Palestinian  populations  of  the  Southern  West Bank  (2005,  2006,  then
2007-2009). 
9 It is this multi-site fieldwork which enabled me to measure the extent of the differences
in perception regarding the separation and the conflict. This article does not pretend to
provide  an  exhaustive  description  of  the  different  perceptions  of  space,  nor  of  the
different levels of foliation which they produce. The aim is rather to show how the policy
of  separation  has  not  formalized  a  pre-existent  separation  line  between  the  two
populations; instead,  it  has re-organized,  through different time-regimes,  the rupture
lines between the numerous groups within the Israeli-Palestinian space and, in so doing,
it has re-organized the boundaries between the groups and communities. 
10 This article consists of three parts.  First,  I  show that,  since the 1990s, the separation
policy generated complex spatial configurations and subjected the Israeli and Palestinian
populations  to  distinct  time  regimes.  Based  on  the  study  of  one  checkpoint,  I  then
describe how these time regimes objectively affect the paths and movements of these
populations  within  the  same  area.  Finally,  by  analyzing  the  distinct  subjectivities
produced  by  these  experiences,  I  show how these  time  regimes,  combined  with  the
subjectivities of the actors,  create a foliation of anthropological spaces.  This foliation
then  enables  a  better understanding  of  the  differences  in  perception,  between  the
different populations, of the Israeli-Palestinian space, the self, the Other and, finally, of
recent developments in the conflict. 
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The spatial boundaries of the separation between
Israel and the West Bank
11 Instituted since 2002, with the construction of the Wall around the West Bank, the Israeli
policy of separation has not generated two distinct spaces separated by a Westphalian
type of border. The security measures further re-organized the movements and paths of
these two populations within the same space.  By facilitating movement between the
Israeli  zones and limiting exchanges between the Palestinian and Israeli  zones,  these
measures attempt to compensate for the proximity and interconnection of these spaces
in order to ensure the security of Israelis during a period of escalation of violence. The
legal mechanisms and infrastructures, which enabled the implementation of this policy of
separation, have led to the emergence of a mobility regime. As we shall see, in the first
place,  this  regime  filters  the  entry  of  Palestinians  into  Israel  and  regulates  their
movements within the West Bank. In the second place, I shall show that this policy not
only creates complex territorial configurations, it also imposes on the Palestinians a time
regime different from that of Israelis.
 
Regime of mobility
12 The first restrictions of movement imposed on the Palestinians were introduced during
the first Intifada (1987-1993). They consisted, initially, of ad hoc security measures and
collective sanctions aimed at repressing the first Palestinian uprising. Subsequently, they
were aimed at preventing Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel during the Oslo process
(1993-2000) (Hass 2002). Finally, they contributed to the application of a systematic policy
of separation between Israelis and Palestinians. Launched by Yitzhak Rabin, this policy
was pursued by succeeding governments (Arieli and Sfard 2008). Neve Gordon (2008) sees,
in this policy which was initiated even before the Oslo process, a desire to reorganize the
Israeli modes of occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
13 In  the  period  1988-1991,  the  Israeli  Civil  Administration,  in  charge  of  the  occupied
Palestinian territories,  instituted a  system of  individual  permits  to  select  Palestinian
workers authorized to come and work in Israel (Abu Zahra 2007, Azulay and Ophir 2008,
Hanieh 2006). These measures marked a break with the preceding period (1967-1988),
during which the Palestinians were able to freely cross the Green Line. The allocation of
permits now depended on the individual’s personal profile. In the first years, the Civil
Administration differentiated between people according to their political activities and
security profile. For example, former prisoners who had been incarcerated in Israel or
those considered a threat, were given special identity cards which prohibited their entry
into  Israel  (Hanieh  2006).  Subsequently,  the  allocation  of  permits  was  determined
according to a bio-social profile (age, profession, matrimonial status, etc.) (Abu Zahra
2007). This profile became particularly restrictive during the second Intifada (2000-2005).
Since the allocation criteria are a constant function of a particular period, it is often
difficult for the Palestinians to know the reasons for an allocation or refusal of a permit
(Ophir and Azulay 2008).  
14 Nevertheless,  these  measures  have  not  stopped  the  entry  of  the  Palestinians  of  the
West Bank into Israel. They aim to filter the undesirables and to regulate the intensity of
the flow. The management of  this  flow lies at  the heart  of  the mechanism of  Israeli
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control, since it has enabled, since the 1990s, the application of collective sanctions or
pressure on the Palestinian Authority (Raijman and Kemp 2008). 
15 It has also contributed to a constant fluctuation in the number of Palestinians entering
Israel.  In the period 1992-1996, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel or in the
settlements was reduced by 50 %. On the eve of the second Intifada, the number stood at
145,100. In contrast, during the second Palestinian uprising (2000-2005), following the
proliferation of suicide attacks in Israel, the tightening of restrictions of movement led to
a new reduction in the number of workers, which fell to 43,000 in 2003 (OCHA 2008). 
16 It was, in particular, these restrictions of movement and not the construction of the Wall
which  contributed  to  the  fall  in  the  number  of  Palestinian  workers  in  Israel  at  the
beginning of the 2000s. In 2003, the construction of the wall was still in its inception and
could  not  really  function  as  an  efficient  barrier.  Subsequently,  one  notes  that  the
progression of its construction, two thirds of which was completed by 2009 (OCHA 2009),
was not accompanied by a reduction in the number of workers employed in Israel, but by
an increase. The number increased progressively from 2003, reaching between 63,000 and
67,000 in 2007 (PCBS 2008, OCHA 2008).
17 However, since this date, only the Palestinians of the West Bank are authorized to enter
Israel  and the  settlements.  During the  1990s,  the  number  of  workers  from Gaza  fell
sharply in comparison to that from the West Bank. In 2007, following the siege of Gaza
imposed by Israel after Hamas came to power, their entry was categorically prohibited.
The evolution in the flux of workers shows that while a clear separation was instituted
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, this was not the case between Israel and the West Bank
(Farsakh 2005). 
18 During  the  second Intifada  (2000-2005),  viewed as  a  central  mechanism in  the  fight
against suicide attacks and as a means of repressing the uprising in Palestinian enclaves,
the restrictions of movement were strengthened and extended right into the heart of the
West Bank.  The  Israeli  army  deployed  numerous  checkpoints  and  new  obstacles
(trenches, road barriers, earth mounds, blocks of concrete, watchtowers, etc.), which are
still  in  use  today.  In  June 2009,  in  the  West Bank,  the  United Nations  identified 698
obstacles of this type including 76 permanent checkpoints and 23 partial check points
(OCHA 2009). In addition to these, the army kept on deploying dozens of “flying check
points”  whose  location  changes  constantly.  Like  the  restrictions  of  movement,  the
localization  of  these  control  devices  and the  boundaries  they  draw have  not  ceased
evolving,  since the beginning of  the second Intifada.  Only some of  the obstacles and
checkpoints remain fixed (Handel 2009).   
19 This system aims, primarily, to maintain the isolation of the Palestinian enclaves from
each  other.  Some  Israeli  military  experts  (Amidror  2007)  explain  that  this  isolation
reduces  the  ability  of  armed  groups  to  exchange  information,  arms  and  act  in  a
coordinated manner. It equally aims to strengthen the army’s capability of action. By
slowing down the movement of the Palestinians, the checkpoints and obstacles give the
military more time to intercept a kamikaze or a wanted individual (Ben Ari et al. 2004). At
the same time, the rapid arteries (by pass roads) put into place by the Israelis accelerate
the army’s movements. 
20 The changing character  of  the restrictions  of  movement  and infrastructures  aims to
destabilize the Palestinian space and render more difficult the planning of the trajectory
of an attack. Of course, the change in the rules and in the localization of obstacles is
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equally due to the fact that Israeli policies, linked to the occupation, are often the product
of tactical decisions, rather than the fruit of any long-term plan. Nonetheless, the blurred
and arbitrary situation created by these constant evolutions, has been extensively re-
appropriated by the Israeli authorities as a means of control (Azulay and Ophir 2008). In
this context, from the point of view of a Palestinian, if an authorization of movement
does not always allow him to move, in practice, the absence of a permit does not always
signify that movement is impossible.  
21 Finally, the separation of paths of the Israeli settlers and the Palestinians is considered a
way of strengthening the security of the former. By prohibiting access to or distancing
the Palestinians from by-pass roads and the settlements, the Israeli authorities have tried
to limit the number of Palestinian attacks against Israeli vehicles and settlements. 
22 Less covered in the press than the Wall, these measures have strengthened the Israeli
presence in the West Bank, both in the West and East of this edifice (Parizot 2009). The
increase in the number of Palestinians working in Israel, since its construction and the
tightening of military measures to the East of the barrier, show that it has not achieved
some of the objectives aimed at: to clearly separate Israeli spaces from Palestinian spaces,
on the one hand and, on the other hand, to end the entry of Palestinians into Israel. In
this context of strong interconnection between Israeli and Palestinian spaces, this edifice
only succeeds  in  superimposing another  limitation on those defined during the Oslo
period (1994-2000) and later. It has created Israeli enclaves on the Palestinian side and
Palestinian enclaves on the Israeli side. In 2007, 72 settlements remained to the East of
the wall, populated by 65,246 Israelis (FMEP 2008), while around 35,000 Palestinians live
in  enclaves  on  the  Israeli  side.  Finally,  the  route  of  the  wall  further  fragments  the
Palestinian zones in the West Bank. Approximately 125,000 Palestinians are encircled by
this barrier on three sides and 26,000 are completely encircled (OCHA 2009).
 
Territorial configurations and time regimes
23 The policy of separation has generated not only complex territorial configurations, it has
especially subjected the Palestinians and the Israelis to radically different conditions of
mobility and time regimes. 
24 According to Eyal Weizman (2007), the construction of by-pass roads, tunnels and bridges
to connect and ease movement between the Israeli  settlements in the West Bank and
Israel  has  created  a  fluid  Israeli  “hyper-space”  detached  from  a  highly  fragmented
Palestinian “infra-space.” Weizman claims that this system has dissociated Israeli spaces
from Palestinian spaces. The border no longer just separates zones on a two-dimensional
map,  it  also  separates  levels  (Israeli  and  Palestinian)  on  a  three-dimensional  map.
Alessandro Petti  (2008),  for  his  part,  perceives a  territorial  regime where an archipel 
system, on the one hand, cohabits with a system of enclaves, on the other. The archipel 
consists of connected islands, which represent the Israeli settlements linked to Israel,
between which movement is fluid and rapid. The enclaves consist of the Palestinian zones
isolated one from the other. Elisha Efrat (2003) demonstrates that, at the beginning of the
2000s,  in the West Bank,  while zones C,  which are under Israeli  control,  constitute a
continuous space, zones A and B are divided into 190 enclaves. 
 
Temporalities and perceptions of the separation between Israelis and Palestin...
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 20 | 2009
6
Map 1: Palestinian and Israeli areas, and main roads in the West Bank (2009)
Map by Marjolaine Barazani (CRFJ), from OCHA (2009)
25 Israeli and Palestinian spaces, nevertheless, are not totally separated (Map 1). Since the
Oslo period, the policy of separation has created a proliferation of spaces with different
statuses.  Within  these  spaces,  the  rules  of  access  vary  according  to  the  populations
considered. These statuses partially reproduce those defined by the Oslo accords. They
delineate zones A, B and C (1994-2000). In zones A and B, under Palestinian autonomy, the
Palestinians can move around relatively freely, while since the beginning of the 2000s,
Israeli citizens no longer have the right to enter these zones. In zones C, under Israeli
control, the Palestinians have been subjected, since 2000, to increasing restrictions, while
Israelis can move around freely. Access to by-pass roads linking the settlements to Israel
has been progressively regulated for the Palestinians (Btselem 2004). In 2009, some of
these roads were still completely prohibited to Palestinians. This is the case of route 443,
linking Jerusalem to Modi’in3.  Since 2003, access by Palestinians to the enclaves situated
between the separation Wall and the Green Line requires a special permit from the Israeli
Civil Administration. Finally, since 2005, access to the Jordan Valley is also subject to
restrictions (Btselem 2007, Handel 2009b). 
26 The  policy  of  separation  thus  creates  more  or  less homogenous  spaces  next  to
intermediary spaces, which are more or less heterogeneous. Zones A and B are populated
and used almost exclusively by Palestinians (approximately 40 % of the West Bank), while
the zones under the jurisdiction of Israeli settlements (42 % of the West Bank, see Handel
20094) are  populated  almost  exclusively  by  Israelis.  The  rest  of  zone C  is  more
heterogeneous in the sense that, here, the two populations cross each other on a daily
basis on roads and at checkpoints. 
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27 Between  2007  and  2009,  most  of  the  by-pass  roads  were  used  both  by  Israeli  and
Palestinian drivers. This was the case for most of the sections of route 60, the main road
that connects the Southern West Bank to the Northern West Bank (Map 1). This is also the
case in Gush Etzion, where Israeli cars travel next to Palestinian cars and pedestrians (
Photo 1).  To  the  South  of  this  region,  in  the  governorship  of  Hebron,  cartographic
representations  (Map 2)  show  that  the  Israeli  by-pass  road  avoids  or  contours  the
Palestinian enclaves. But, when driving on this road, travelers often pass right through
Palestinian villages, as in the case of Beit Ummar (Photo 2) and the al-Arrub refugee camp.
The East segment of route no. 1, the main artery linking Jerusalem to the Dead Sea, which
is used by many tourists and Israeli travelers, is also used by Palestinians.  At its Eastern
(‘Azariya-Maale Adumim) and Western tips (the Dead Sea), Palestinian merchants greet
the Israeli  settlers and tourists who visit  their establishments.  Even on roads strictly
prohibited to the Palestinians, such as route 443, linking Jerusalem to Modi’in and to
Tel Aviv, one finds similar crossing points. Israeli drivers, traveling in the direction of
Tel Aviv and passing by the Maccabim checkpoint, must take note of Palestinians using
this road at the level of this point of passage. In view of the number of Israelis, from West
Jerusalem or the center of the country, who use this road as well as other by-pass roads,
these crossings and encounters with the “Other” involve both settlers and people living
within the limits of the 1967 border. Finally, many check points situated in the West Bank
are aimed both at Palestinians and Israelis.
 
Photo 1: View of Road 60, Gush Etzion
Israeli cars driving next to Palestinian cars.
Photo P. Renno, 2008 
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Map 2: Isreali cartographic representation of Road 60
Road 60 (south of Jerusalem/north of Hebron), passing between Palestinian enclaves, without
entering them.
From Israel : Road Atlas, Tel Aviv, Mapa, 2009
 
Photo 2: Landscape on Road 60
Road 60 passing through Beit Ummar.
Photo C. Parizot, 2008
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28 In this context of an increase in limits and zones, the policy of separation does not really
separate spaces. On the other hand, it imposes different regimes of control and mobility
on populations in the same spaces. In order to understand how it operates, it is necessary
to  consider  the  different  regimes  of  mobility  and  regimes  of  time  to  which  these
populations are subjected. Such an approach is all the more necessary in light of the fact
that, since the 1990s, the security measures have created a distortion or asymmetry of
space/time.  The movement  of  the  Palestinians  has  been considerably  impeded while
Israelis are moving around more and more rapidly. In this context, the confinement of
the Palestinians is both special and temporal (Collins 2009, Handel 2009, Peteet 2009).    
29 Furthermore, as underlined by Ariel Handel (2009), this asymmetry is strengthened by
the different uses of space imposed by the mobility regime. While Israelis benefit from a
predictable, fluid space, as in a modern, cartographic territorial system, the space of the
Palestinians is, in contrast, maintained in a “pre-modern” subjective position: given the
fragmentation  of  the  enclaves,  the  unpredictability  of  the  Israeli  restrictions  and
obstacles (flying checkpoints, closures, contradictory orders varying from one patrol to
another), cartography, in terms of modern knowledge, is of no use to them (Havkin 2008).
The geography, in which they move around, consists of itineraries evaluated according to
the length of time of a journey and the location of random obstacles, not according to
distance or  predefined routes.  Ariel  Handel  (ibid.),  moreover,  suggests  perceiving the
Israeli-Palestinian  conflict  no  longer  solely  as  a  territorial  conflict,  but  also  as  a
structured conflict around the control of the use of space. 
 
Regime of time and mobility experiences
30 In order to show how these regimes of time structure, in practice, different uses of space/
time in the same places,  I  shall  present the ethnographic observations which I  made
regarding three types of crossings at the checkpoint was that of Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil.
Located in the Southern West Bank, on the Hebron-Beer Sheva artery, it is crossed by
Israeli  Jews,  Palestinians  with  Israeli  citizenship  (the  Bedouins  of  the  Negev)  and
West Bank  Palestinians.  The  structure  and  control  measures  are  similar  to  those
prevailing at  other  checkpoints  situated around the West Bank.  Hence,  they offer  an
example which can be generalized. 
31 Through the three types of crossings, which I highlight here, I demonstrate, here, that
the  restrictions  of  movement  condition  a  multitude  of  relationships  to  space/time.
Hence, I stress the need to surpass the binary approach, which governs most research on
the effects of the separation policy and that tend to be re-introduced by the very concept
of spatial “asymmetry”.
 
The Wadi al-Khalil/Meitar Checkpoint
32 In 2008, the Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint was the daily crossing point for around
1000 Palestinian workers and merchants doted with an entry permit into Israel. Located
at the Southern tip of route 60, it was also used by 2500 Israeli settlers who live in South
of  the  Hebron mountains  and who travel  daily  to  their  places  of  work  in  Israel.  In
addition, it was used by a minority of Israeli Jews from the Negev region in order to travel
to Jerusalem. At the end of the 2000s, apart from the settlers, few Israeli Jews residing in
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Israel use this road, which passes through the West Bank. Palestinian attacks on cars and
travelers using this road during the first Intifada (1987-1993) and the second Intifada
(2000-2005) dissuaded many people from using it.  Finally, the checkpoint is frequently
crossed by Bedouins of the Negev as they make their way to the markets of Hebron or the
cities of the Southern West Bank: Dhahriyya, Samû‘, Yatta and Dûra (Map 3).
 
Map 3: South of Hebron Hills, and Beer Sheva area
Map by Marjolaine Barazani (CRFJ), from OCHA (2009)
33 However,  in the course of  the last  thirteen years,  the movement modalities  of  these
populations have changed as a result of changes in the roadblock. Initially practically
identical,  they became, over the years, more and more discriminatory. These changes
were similar to those observed at other crossing points situated on the Green Line or
along the separation Wall.  They testify,  first,  to the increase in material  and human
means invested in the implementation of this security policy. Secondly, they demonstrate
the means deployed in order to organize and separate the paths of the populations in
question. Finally, the materialization and consolidation of these measures represent the
enduring consolidation of the policy of separation (Havkin 2008). 
34 In 1996, when I began my initial research in the region, the point of control consisted of a
simple roadblock (mahsom [Hebrew]), which took the form of a temporary, improvised
structure made up of  concrete blocks and sometimes a look-out tower from which a
soldier  would survey the surroundings.  At  this  time,  Israelis  and Palestinians  passed
through the same type of  identity  control  conducted by a  few soldiers.  Israeli  Jews,
residing in the settlements or in Israel, could however avoid the long lines by overtaking
the queue of Palestinian cars and greeting the soldiers. The roadblock was removed for a
short period, then re-installed at the beginning of the second Intifada (September 2000).  
35 Towards the middle of the 2000s, parallel to the construction of the separation Barrier, its
structure took on a more permanent form. The checkpoint was, then, intended to become
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one  of  many  “terminals”  or  “crossing  points”  (ma’avar  [Hebrew])  responsible  for
screening  the  movements  of  Israelis  and  Palestinians  between  the  two  sides  of  the
Barrier. In 2007, its construction was almost completed. The new terminal is divided into
two sections. The first consists of three parallel lines reserved for private vehicles and
trucks registered in Israel. These lines are flanked by sentry boxes where the soldiers
stand.  The second is  reserved for  Palestinians  and can only  be  traversed on foot.  A
parking is allocated for their vehicles. Finally, offices have been constructed to house the
personnel and a concrete look-out tower has been erected to defend the installation (
Photo 3). 
36 On January 1, 2008, management of the checkpoint was delegated by the Israeli army to
the security company “White Snow” (sheleg lavan [Hebrew]). Since then, sixty employees
work  at  this  checkpoint:  thirty  armed  guards  (me’avtekhim  [Hebrew])  and  thirty
“selectors” or controllers (selectorim or bodkin [Hebrew])  responsible for checking the
identity of travelers. These employees are supervised by a representative of the Ministry
of Defense. Like other checkpoints run by private companies, the Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil
checkpoint  is  equipped  with  very  sophisticated  equipment:  individual  scanners,
biometric  systems  and  scanners  for  transported  merchandise.  The  mediation  by
machines is based on a logic of sophistication, standardization, and bureaucratization of
control,  as  well  as  on the desire  to  protect  the personnel  of  the checkpoint  against
potential attacks by armed Palestinian groups (Havkin 2008).
 
Photo 3: Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint
View from the Israeli side.
Photo C. Parizot, 2007
37 The  objective  of  the  armed  guards  is  to  defend  the  installation.  The  “selectors”  or
“controllers”  (selectorim,  bodkim)  implement  distinct,  adequate  procedures  of  control
according to the identity and status of the travelers. The checkpoint operates a double-
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screening process: on the one hand, screening of people aimed at avoiding the entry of
undesirables into Israel and, on the other, screening of travelers in order to subject them
to distinct regimes of control and time. 
 
One place, three temporalities, three crossings
38 Thus, since the mid 2000s, Israeli Jews, Bedouins and West Bank Palestinians crossing the
checkpoint, are treated differently and experience a different level and form of mobility.
Israeli  Jews,  settlers  or  otherwise,  who  cross  the  crossing  point  by  car  are  rarely
controlled  or  questioned  by  the  personnel.  The  structure  of  the  checkpoint,  the
specialization of tasks between guards and selectors make the crossing more formal than
when it was controlled by the army. Nonetheless, since they are known to the personnel,
many Israeli settlers exchange greetings with the employees before the barrier is opened
at the point of the sentry box. Their crossing resembles more that of a motorway tollgate
than that of a border terminal. One of the guards explained to me that, for Jews, the
checkpoint functions primarily as an “internal crossing point” (ma’avar pnimi [Hebrew]). 
39 The Bedouins, who travel from Beer Sheva to the West Bank via the Wadi al-Khalil/Meitar
checkpoint, experience a different form of mobility from that of Israeli Jews. They possess
Israeli citizenship and can therefore go through the crossing point by car. But they are
treated differently by the personnel of the checkpoint and engage therefore in a different
form of interaction. In 2008, the personnel was ordered by the Ministry of Defense to
systematically control “the Arabs and the Bedouins.” The distinction made by the guards
between Arabs and Bedouins is revealing. It underlines to what extent the ethnicization
process of the Bedouins, since the creation of the State of Israel, has reinforced the notion
that,  while  Arab,  this  population is  considered by many Israelis,  as  a  distinct  ethnic
group, such as the Druze (Parizot 2001, 2006). And it, especially, demonstrates how such
distinctions are reproduced and validated by the administrative apparatus and, notably,
by the policy of separation. 
40 Applied in the course of 2008, this systematic control was experienced negatively by the
Bedouins  of  the  environs.  Sâlim,  a  lawyer  from  Hûra,  who  travels  regularly  to  the
West Bank for business, told me of his discontent at this differential treatment, which he
perceived  as  flagrant  discrimination.  In  his  view,  the  control  of  identities  and
merchandise, carried out by the private company, was even more strict and rigorous that
that previously carried out by the soldiers. According to Sâlim and many others in the
region, during the 2000s, Israeli soldiers frequently prohibited passage to drivers who
said they wished to travel to Palestinian villages in the area: Dhariyya, Samû‘, Yatta or the
city of Hebron. In order to avoid being turned back, the drivers pretended that they were
traveling to Jerusalem. Their declaration appeared sufficiently convincing in the eyes of
the soldiers, and they were let through without further ado. Other interlocutors informed
me that it was sometimes easy to come to an arrangement with the soldiers so that they
would shut their eyes regarding certain products of popular consumption being brought
into Israel.   
41 After  a  year of  more stringent  control  than that  of  the army,  the security company
changed its policy. In 2009, the control of Bedouin travelers was gradually alleviated.
Ahmad at-Ta‘âmre, from Rahat, explained to me that, now, when people cross the Meitar/
Wadi al-Khalil  checkpoint,  they are no longer interrogated or searched as previously:
people  bringing  back  fruit  and  vegetables  from  Palestinian  markets  are  no  longer
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bothered. In accordance with the regulations posted on billboards at the entrance to the
checkpoint, the security company prohibits the entry of meat, eggs and milk from the
Palestinian Territories. The change in attitude of the security company at Meitar/Wadi
al-Khalil, as from mid 2009, is part of a general policy aimed at easing the movement of
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship between Israel and the West Bank. It was put into
effect following the election of the Netanyahu government (Marteu 2009). Nevertheless,
in  spite  of  the  alleviation of  the  control  procedures,  the  Bedouins  still  perceive  the
mahsum (arabization of the Hebrew term mahsom, meaning roadblock) as an obstacle and
cross this point with some apprehension.
42 Finally, the Palestinians of the West Bank, experience a form of mobility which differs
from that of the Israeli Jews and the Bedouins. The crossing takes longer time. Of course,
the  management  by  the  security  company  and  the  installation  of  a  more  extensive
structure appear to have accelerated the crossing, which takes less time than prior to
2008, when the checkpoint was managed by the army. In the morning, at rush hour,
travelers sometimes had to wait up to two hours to cross over. In 2008, the time needed to
cross varied according to the day of the week and the time of arrival at the checkpoint.
Sometimes, the process could be very uncomfortable and humiliating. In April, soon after
opening time (4.00-4.30), workers could cross over in approximately twenty minutes. In
contrast, at around 5.00, the queue could lengthen and comprise up to 500 or 600 people,
making the procedure much longer for the workers. The length of time for crossing the
check point remains therefore very uncertain5. Some users, such as Za‘al Abu Turiyya,
informed me that, when they are late, they often prefer to circumvent the checkpoint via
smuggling routes, even when they possess an entry permit into Israel. 
43 The process for Palestinians crossing the checkpoint differs from that of the Bedouins
and Israeli Jews. They do not pass through the central lines designated for vehicles, but
on the side, via a complex set-up. Everything evokes an intensity of control and passage
from one space to another: the organization of the set-up, the architecture of the control
mechanism,  made  up  of  turnstiles,  counters,  sophisticated  electronic  and  biometric
equipment and, finally, the inspection by the armed guards and the interactions with
them and the selectors. 
 
The limits of asymmetry
44 This quick comparison of  the forms of  crossing of  these three populations and their
evolution  shows  to  what  extent  the  policy  of  separation  has  progressively  imposed,
during the 2000s, different regimes of time on each population. These regimes of time
create gaps between the experiences felt by these populations in the same places. In this
context, it is difficult to talk of “asymmetry” since the term evokes too much a binary
opposition.  Indeed,  the  control  procedures  at  the  Wadi  al-Khalil/Meitar  checkpoint
define several regimes of control and time. The case of the Bedouins, Arab citizens of
Israel, demonstrates that, by reproducing certain Israeli classifications, such as those that
distinguish “Bedouins” from “Arabs”, the treatment of each group reintroduces divisions
even within the Arab population of Israel. 
45 An  analysis  of  the  trajectories  of  the  Palestinians  of  Jerusalem  would  support  this
argument as it would underline other distinctions created by the policy of mobility. The
Palestinians of Jerusalem are residents of Israel but not citizens. They therefore possess a
special status, which subjects them to other limitations than those of Palestinians with
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Israeli  citizenship.  Not  being  officially  prohibited  from  entering  zones  A  under
Palestinian autonomy, the Palestinians of Jerusalem would be able to pass through the
Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint while pretending that they are entering a Palestinian
zone and not be turned back. International agents working with diplomatic organizations
or within certain NGOs enjoy mobility privileges which are not accorded either to Israelis
or to Palestinians. Their treatment at the checkpoint is therefore different from others
and creates additional experiences of movement. 
 
Time, space and perceptions of the separation
46 I now wish to show that these radically distinct experiences of places, according to the
time regimes which the different populations are subjected to, plays a determinant role
in  the  manner  in  which  the  populations  perceive  their  spaces  of  movement.  It  is
important to take into account the role of subjectivities. As Michel de Certeau points out
(1990, 173-4) “space is a place that is used.” Quoting Merleau Ponty, he adds “there are as
many  spaces  as  distinct  spatial  experiences.”  I  demonstrate,  here,  that  the  distinct
experiences  of  the  Wadi  al-Khalil/Meitar  checkpoint  create  various  “anthropological
spaces.” In particular, I emphasize the perception of the length of the crossing and how it
connects with that of the other daily activities of each group. In order to do this, I borrow
the concept  of  “temporal  pollution” defined by Ulli  Zeitler  (1999),  which evokes “an
undesired [time], a means to [achieve] an end, [a moment] without intrinsic value” and
which contrasts with a structured time informed with meaning. 
47 Based on this, I stress to what extent the construction of these anthropological spaces/
times enables us to understand the way the populations of the Israeli-Palestinian space
perceive, in a distinct manner, the localization of limits and the concept of separation.
 Finally,  I  show that the separation creates a foliation (feuilletage)  of  “anthropological
spaces/time” which places the groups in a hierarchy and redraws the lines of separation
between the populations of  the Israeli-Palestinian space,  beyond the mere opposition
between Israelis and Palestinians. 
 
Temporality and the extension of Israeli spaces
48 The rapidity and ease with which Israeli Jews cross the Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint
turns the length of the crossing into a “temporal pollution,” that is, a waste of time which
ones strives to reduce to a minimum. This length of time, without any intrinsic value, is
part of a steady, limited, predictable journey, integrated within more meaningful social
and professional  activities.  This  construction of  time,  combined with  the  absence  of
interaction with the Palestinians in this place and along the roads leading to the terminal,
greatly condition the importance accorded to the encounter. The Israeli Jews, who cross
the terminal in the morning, inevitably note the presence of workers standing in line as
well as their cars parked in the parking. However, the length of time during which they
face these workers is relatively short, compared to the time invested in the rest of their
daily activities. Furthermore, constructed as a “temporal pollution,” the crossing is not
informed with  meaning  or  emotion  as  are  their  other  daily  activities.  Thus,  from a
qualitative and quantitative view, the length of time during which the Israeli Jews pass by
Palestinians is not sufficiently significant in relation to that of their other daily activities
to highlight their presence within the landscape. 
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49 The insignificant nature taken by the Palestinian presence, in the context of the mobility
of Israeli Jews traveling in the West Bank, also plays a determinant role in the perception
of their space of movement. I noted the same mechanisms in my observation of the paths
of Israeli Jews traveling on route 443 and on route 1, which connects Jerusalem to the
Dead  Sea.  The  people  who  travel  on  these  roads  accord  so  little  importance  to  the
presence of Palestinian cars and pedestrians that,  when one asks them whether they
already entered the occupied Palestinian Territories, “ha-shtakhim”, they usually answer
in  the  negative.  When  questioned,  the  answers  of  these  people  show  that  they  are
convinced that the construction of the wall has created two distinct spaces in a discreet
manner. Echoing the expression of Yitzhak Rabin, some even go so far as to say: “Now we
are here and they are there.” 
50 The rapidity of  their  movement,  the construction of  their  movement as  a  “temporal
pollution,” and the manner in which these factors reduce the presence of the Palestinians
to a non-event, practically efface the latter from the landscape of Israeli Jewish travelers
or relegates them to a special status. This is a determining process in that it tends to “
Israelize” the space that  is  being crossed and to strengthen the feeling that the Wall
separates.   
51 However, the rapidity of movement and the form of mobility are not always enough to “
Israelize” a  space.  The  proliferation  of  checkpoints  and  security  mechanisms  in  the
West Bank,  since  the  1990s,  exercise  a  reverse  effect  to  these  mobility-connected
processes (Parizot 2009). In the first place, the materialization and perpetuation of the
separation reintroduce new limits. Some Israeli settlers complain that the checkpoints
and the Wall have created a discontinuity between Israel and the West Bank settlements
or have set a boundary between a space of legitimate residence (West of the wall) and
illegitimate residence (East of the wall). Moshe Bar Tov, from Bet El, a settlement near
Ramallah, informed me that these security measures have distanced his family socially
from their parents and their friends residing in Israel. The checkpoints have slowed down
movement on the roads, since they sometimes create traffic jams during rush hours.  And
they  have  made  the  security  atmosphere  in  the  West Bank  tenser  and  indirectly
reintroduced the threat of the Palestinians. 
52 As a result, the security measures tend to dissuade people living in Israel from visiting
friends or families living in the West Bank. They have helped nurture a geography of fear.
Many Israeli  Jews,  who live on the boundaries of  the 1967 Israeli  border,  view these
security measures as real obstacles.  Tamar, whom I interviewed in the city of Meitar
(Negev), views the checkpoint as a door which opens onto a dangerous world, that of the
shtakhim. She, therefore, avoids crossing it or even coming close to it. In 2005, Sima, a
resident of Tel Aviv, refused to visit her cousins in Alfei Menashe, a settlement situated,
nonetheless, to the West of the wall. Crossing a checkpoint located prior to the settlement
represented, in her eyes, entry into the occupied Territories (shtakhim). 
53 In 2007, Shai, an Israeli architect residing in Israel, South-West of Jerusalem, expressed
similar concerns regarding the security measures. From Srigim a place situated in Israel,
south of Bet Shemesh, he drives, several times a week, through the “tunnels’ road” that
pass through Gush Etzion, in order to get to Jerusalem. He told me that the security
measures, and particularly the big slanting concrete walls, which separate the Israeli by-
pass road from the Palestinian city of Beit Jâla, made the Palestinians, in his eyes, more
and more threatening. He added: “These walls were not placed there by chance!” When
taking this road, he has the real impression of going through occupied territories. But the
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feeling of being threatened had not led him to change routes. On the contrary, in 2009, he
continued  to  take  this  route  in  order  to  attend  business  meetings  or  shop  at  a
supermarket.  The fact  of  taking this  route regularly tends to gradually give him the
feeling of security and integrates the “tunnels’ road” in his daily routine.      
54 As  Michel  de  Certeau  (1990)  explains,  routine  makes  things  secure  and  favors  the
appropriation of  spaces.  Thus,  the routinization of journeys on by-pass roads,  in the
context  of  relative calm since the end of  the second Intifada,  and the facilitation of
mobility is gradually changing the perspectives of the Israeli population regarding spaces
crossed and the separation.  For some,  these factors have progressively re-integrated,
within what is considered sovereign Israeli space, West Bank spaces which the uprising
had  rendered  dangerous  and  hardly  used.  One  should  note  that  this  process  of
progressive re-integration via ordinary spatial practices includes spaces situated beyond
the separation wall, such as the road leading from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea and route
443 (Modi’in-Jerusalem). 
55 This re-integration of West Bank spaces is a progressive process and is not uniformly
shared by the Israeli  Jewish population.  If  it  is  highly conditioned by the separation
policy, it can only truly be achieved through the routinization of spatial practices, which
is itself a function of the journeys of the actors. Like Shai, they view certain by-pass roads
as intermediary spaces between Israel and the shtakhim.
56 Nonetheless, observation of the general evolution of Israeli movement, during the last
five years, shows to what extent this process of re-integration of certain West Bank zones
within sovereign Israeli space seems to have developed. Since 2005, more cars are using
these arteries.  Since 2007,  I  have observed more and more motorcyclists and cyclists
traveling on route 443, route 90 (Jordan Valley) and particularly route 60 in Gush Etzion,
 in order to go to work, or as a part of a leisure activity on Fridays or Saturdays. The
presence of cyclists shows to what extent these spaces are seen as safe spaces by some
Israelis,  while during the Intifada, even car drivers feared attacks by lone Palestinian
snipers. 
 
Temporality and alienation of Palestinian spaces
57 The Palestinians of the West Bank construct radically different anthropological spaces/
times from those of Israeli  Jews,  when they cross checkpoints or drive along by-pass
roads.  The process of  passing through Israeli  zones and the organization it  demands
implies so much effort that these activities have become central to their daily lives (Abu
Zahra 2007, Handel 2008, Peteet 2009). In order to enter Israel, or certain zones within the
West Bank (Jordan Valley, enclaves between the Wall and the Green Line, East Jerusalem),
they  need  to  obtain  a  permit.  The  acquisition  and  renewal  of  such  a  document
necessitates a long, random bureaucratic process. Furthermore, the policy of separation
and the fragmentation of  enclaves have considerably lengthened the time needed to
travel  from  their  homes  to  their  workplaces.  In  addition  to  the  time  spent  at  a
checkpoint, there is also the discontinuity in the means of transport in order to reach
transfer points and then proceed to their workplaces.  The workers have to invest several
hours travel, to and fro, for journeys which took less than an hour in the 1990s. The time
invested on these trips affects as much their moments of sociability as their rest time,
once at home. 
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58 In contrast to Israeli Jews, the process of crossing a checkpoint is not perceived as a
“temporal pollution.”  Of course, the crossing constitutes a considerable waste of time,
but it is also an extremely significant and structuring moment. It is a period of time
which concentrates all the attention and energy of the actors. First of all, it is a moment
of uncertainty. While the Palestinians depend on the crossing to ensure their livelihood,
the  crossing is  always  uncertain.  This  feeling derives  in  part  from past  and present
experiences of movement and from the manner in which the Israeli authorities impose
the  restrictions  of  movement.  The  regulations  and  obstacles  are  viewed  as  very
unpredictable and arbitrary, in the sense that they operate according to a logic which
Palestinians  do  not  understand  or  master.  The  standardization  of  procedures  at
checkpoints,  such  as  Wadi  al-Khalil/Meitar,  in  2008,  has  not  lifted  this  arbitrary
dimension.  On  the  contrary,  the  biometric  systems  and  electronic  equipment  have
introduced  new  uncertainties.  In  many  terminals,  on  a  regular  basis,  the  security
equipment fails to function. Thus, the demagnetization of certain magnetic cards has led
to some Palestinians being turned back. 
59 The crossing of checkpoints is all the more significant in that it also implies a degree of
latent violence. It is associated with danger. In spite of the architecture of the terminal
which, according to the Israeli Minister of Defense, was designed to regulate and channel,
in  the  “best  conditions.”  the  passage  of  Palestinian  workers,  the  latter  continue  to
associate the place with potential physical danger. Hisham, a worker from the city of
Samû‘, often remembers incidents at the checkpoints. Like others, he remembers that one
of his colleagues had his arm broken, in 2007, when he was pushed by the crowd in one of
the steel turnstiles. Furthermore, while the Israeli army considers that the delegation of
the  management  of  checkpoints  to  private  companies  depoliticizes  this  space,  the
Palestinians continue to view the process of crossing a checkpoint as a confrontation and
exposure to the power of the occupier.  The feelings of vulnerability and lack of control
over the uncertain element of  violence that  accompanies  the crossing reinforces the
experience of humiliation on a daily basis (Bornstein 2002). In other words, the treatment
experienced  at  checkpoints  and  the  manner  in  which  the  Palestinians  perceive  the
crossing transform this space into a central marker between the space they come from
and “juwwa” (the interior), namely Israel. 
60 In  short,  while  the  insignificant  temporality  of  passage  of  Israeli  Jews  crossing  the
checkpoints  tends  to  attenuate  the  presence  of  boundaries,  that  experienced by  the
Palestinians anchors and underlines these boundaries in their space. In the first instance,
this  process  enables  a  re-appropriation  and  re-Israelization  of certain  spaces  in  the
West Bank and, in the second place, it leads to an alienation of spaces for the Palestinians.
In addition,  for  many of  them it  is  no longer the Green Line which operates  as  the
significant marker, as it partially did throughout the 1990s, but it is the new boundaries
defined by checkpoints erected throughout the West Bank. 
61 However, it is important to stress that, for the Palestinians, the new markers created by
 checkpoints, sometimes located within the Green Line, do not separate a Palestinian space
from an Israeli space. Palestinians, who travel from their cities or villages to reach the
Meitar/Wadi al-Khalil checkpoint, must cross different types of spaces in which they are
subjected to different forms of authority and restrictions.  Those,  who come from the
cities of Samû‘ or Yatta, leave zones controlled by the Palestinian Authority, to travel on
one of the roads leading to the checkpoint, route 60 or route 317 (Map 3). Since they are
located in zone C, these two routes are controlled exclusively by the Israeli army and
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police. The process of crossing these different spaces is very significant since it implies
different modes of transport and experiences. 
62 Ahmad aj-Jakâkse, a construction worker, resident of Samû‘, takes his car at around 3.00
a.m. to travel to the center of town. His car is a “mashtuba”, an old Israeli car originally
slated for the scrap yard for car parts, but used by individuals. He bought it from a garage
owner in Samû‘ who imports this unlicensed cars from Israel. These cars cost less than
new or second-hand cars registered with the Palestinian Authority, particularly since the
owner does not need to pay to have them registered. In the region of Samû‘ and Yatta,
one in three cars is a mashtuba. These vehicles can be driven in this enclave since the
Palestinian police, under pressure from Yatta’s influential families, does not book their
drivers. But, since they do not have an official Israeli or Palestinian number plate, these
cars do not have the right to travel on Israeli-controlled roads. Thus, Ahmad is forced to
leave his car in Samû‘ and take a minibus in order to reach the checkpoint. Movement on
Israeli-controlled  roads  implies  a  certain  level  of  uncertainty.  In  2008-2009,  the
constantly  changing  location  of  barriers  and  obstacles  around  the  Samû‘  and  Yatta
enclave (heaps of earth, concrete blocks, road barriers, etc.) erected by the army, forced
the drivers of  Palestinian minibuses to frequently modify their itineraries within the
same week or month.  The sudden erection of a flying checkpoint and the unpredictable
conduct of the military or police patrols on the road never guaranteed the length of a
journey or its outcome. The checkpoints are, therefore, viewed by the Palestinians as
another phase of control in a journey that covers several spaces, and in the course of
which they may be exposed to different obstacles or regulating authorities. 
63 Thus, while the Palestinians associate the notion of separation with an increase in the
restrictions of movement and closures, they do not perceive it as a splitting off from
Israel. On the contrary, in their eyes, the policy of separation has consistently reinforced
the presence and diffuse violence of the Israeli occupation. The mobility conditions of
Israeli Jews, their practices and perceptions of space tend to efface or render insignificant
the presence of the Palestinians on the by-pass roads and at the level of the checkpoints.
In contrast, the restrictions of movement imposed on the Palestinians, their practices and
their perceptions of space, render them hypersensitive to the presence of the Israelis on
these spaces, and beyond these spaces. The confrontation with the occupier affects not
only their movement, but also their free time once at home, since their social and rest
time is itself structured by these restrictions of movement. Finally, the daily crossings
over, on the one hand, boundaries separating zones A, B and C and, on the other hand,
boundaries separating checkpoints from Israel, operate as social rituals which favor the
interiorization or incorporation of these boundaries.  This process of interiorization is so
strong that it dissuades many Palestinians from taking certain by-pass roads or entering
certain spaces where prohibition of access has been lifted by the Israelis. In short, while
the routinization of the paths of Israeli Jews tends, since the end of the second Intifada, to
extend  Israeli  spaces  and  efface  former  boundaries,  for  the  Palestinians,  this
routinization has produced further alienation. 
 
Foliation of space/time
64 The  example  of  the  Bedouins  of  the  Negev  enables  us  to  highlight  a  third  form of
construction of space/time. The Bedouins undergo a different experience of mobility and
crossing  at  the  Wadi  al-Khalil/Meitar  checkpoint,  which  distances  them  both  from
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Israelis  and  Palestinians.  Systematically  checked  by  the  guards,  they  perceive  the
checkpoint as a potential obstacle. The majority know that the guards of the White Snow
security company cannot legally prevent them from going through, since, in crossing the
checkpoint, they remain in a territory controlled by Israel (zone C) and one authorized to
Israeli citizens. However, the questions posed by the guards, the treatment and distinct
time regime they are subjected to, in contrast to Israeli Jews, constantly reminds them of
the suspicion with which they are regarded in Israel and thus of their marginality within
Israeli society. The controls and the time regime underline ipso facto the fact that they are
crossing  a  space  in  order  to  enter  another,  two  spaces  between  which  people  and
merchandise cannot pass freely.  Similarly,  the difference between the treatment they
undergo and that of  their  West Bank Palestinian relatives or neighbors validates and
emphasizes the distinction in status between these two populations.  
65 Thus, the checkpoint and the boundaries it produces do not simply create a different use
of space/time but also place the populations in a hierarchy according to their ability of
movement. The fact of possessing this or that status has direct practical implications on
the structuring of daily life and on the relationships between the populations. This point
underlines the temporal dimension of the borders created by the policy of separation
between the communities and the manner in which the latter integrate them within
differentiation processes. 
66 These three examples demonstrate, once again, that the concept of the asymmetry of
space/time is deceptive in the sense that the differences in the perception of space/time
observed between these populations cannot be viewed in a binary manner. It is more
pertinent  to  speak of  a  “foliation”6 of  space/time in the sense of  a  superposition of
anthropological spaces on a same geographic space, a foliation which reinforces the fissures
between the groups as much at the level of their status as of their perception.
67 The inclusion of  other examples such as that of  the Palestinians of  Jerusalem or the
Palestinians  of  other  regions  would  highlight  other  levels  of  this  foliation  of
anthropological spaces and show the extent to which this process contributes to dividing
and ranking groups within Palestinian society according to their freedom of movement.
For the gradation of space, which emerged in the 2000s in the West Bank, did not only
fragmentize the space of the Palestinians, it also increased the number of statuses and the
conditions of mobility. The Palestinians of villages hemmed in between the Wall and the
Green Line do not have the same status,  or the same conditions of mobility,  as their
neighbors situated to the East of the Wall. In consequence, their perceptions of space are
very different. Furthermore, the mechanism of separation is not applied in a uniform
manner between regions of the same status, notably because of the gradual evolution in
the construction of the Wall and other separation measures. The region of the North
West Bank was enclosed more rapidly by the Wall than the South, and movement towards
Israel  was  less  lined with  obstacles.  Moreover,  in  view of  the  level  of  confrontation
between the Israeli army and the Palestinians, certain regions were subjected to tighter
restrictions of movement than others in the course of the last ten years. Finally, it is
possible  to  differentiate  between  the  experiences  of  the  Palestinians,  according  to
whether they possess a permit or not, or whether they have access to networks which
facilitate movement, such as contraband networks. 
68 The numerous levels of foliation demonstrate that the implementation of the policy of
separation has created divisions which, in turn, are delineating new lines of separation
within the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Within the Israeli population, by imposing
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different regimes of time based on ethnic affiliation, it is reinforcing splits between Jews
and Arabs.  One should also take into consideration the different levels of  movement
between Israeli  Jews.  Within the Palestinian population,  these splits are brought into
effect both through the differences in status among the Palestinians, according to the
spaces in which they live, and the differences connected to the evolution of the policy of
closures. 
 
Conclusion
69 The policy of separation implemented by Israel since the 1990s and strengthened in the
course  of  the  2000s  dissociates  movement  more  than spaces.  It  subjects  the  various
populations  of  the  Israeli-Palestinian  space  to  distinct  time  regimes.  Instead  of
strengthening the separation lines between the two groups, Israeli  and Palestinian, it
tends  to  reinforce  or  introduce  new  divisions  within  these  populations.  Certain
distinctions  reproduce  differences  in  status  or  ethnic  classifications  which  prevailed
previously. This is the case of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship or of the Palestinians of
Jerusalem. Others, in contrast, such as those related to a person’s bio-social profile or the
status of the enclave in which a Palestinian resides, have been introduced by the policy of
separation. Through the time regime which it imposes on the different populations, the
separation  mechanism  is  therefore  redrawing  the  contours  of  the  statutory  and
community borders of the groups within the Israeli-Palestinian space.   
70 This form of hierarchy, however,  only takes on meaning through the subjectivities it
creates and with which it is informed. By impacting on the use of space, the different
regimes of time contribute to shaping radically different perceptions according to the
populations. In a process of “foliation”, these perceptions superimpose on each other, as
“anthropological  spaces/time”.  The practices of  the actors play a central  role in this
process. Through their daily practices, the populations of the Israeli-Palestinian space
develop  and  construct  distinct  anthropological  spaces/time  which  condition  their
perceptions of the boundaries, the Other and the conflict. 
71 This foliation has direct political implications, not only because it redefines the contours
of  the  groups,  but  particularly  because  it  greatly  conditions  the  expectations  of  the
populations with regard to the separation mechanism and the evolution of the conflict.
The  daily  journeys  of  the  Israeli  Jewish  travelers  along  by-pass  roads  and  through
checkpoints have progressively effaced the boundaries created by the second Intifada
between Israel and the West Bank.  By rendering these spaces secure, the routinization of
these journeys has reincorporated them within sovereign Israeli space and pushed back
the border with the occupied Territories (shtakhim). This process helps to reinforce the
illusion that a clear separation has been created by the construction of a separation wall
and that the conflict has been pushed over to “the other side” of the Wall. Widely shared
by the Israeli Jewish population, this feeling has transformed the status quo into a viable
situation and helps postpone the need to find a solution. Conversely, the daily movements
of the Palestinians along the by-pass roads have led them to interiorize the boundaries
set  by  the  policy  of  separation  and  thus  to  reduce  their  spaces.  In  their  eyes,  the
separation does not really correspond to a split with Israel but more to a reinforcement of
the presence and violence of  the occupation,  and therefore to a deterioration of  the
conflict. 
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72 The influence of space/time practices is all the more significant in that it also affects
international  observers.  Members  of  diplomatic  bodies  or  NGOs,  researchers  and
journalists develop their own perceptions of the separation and of the spaces. Falling
under different time regimes, their perceptions differ from both those of Israelis and of
Palestinians.  International  representatives  who keep to  the Israeli  space and by-pass
roads  of  the  West Bank,  and  do  not  enter  Palestinian  enclaves,  tend  to  develop
perceptions of a continuous Israeli space, separated from a Palestinian space which is also
continuous. Those who work on the Palestinian side take more into consideration the
fragmentation of Palestinian enclaves and the obstacle it constitute for the Palestinian
nation building project. However, the regimes of time to which they are subjected differ
from  those  of  the  Palestinians.  Their  ability  to  routinize  their  journeys  across  the
ensemble of enclaves enables them to preserve a global vision of the Palestinian space
extending between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a spatial perspective which has no
tangible basis in the daily lives of the Palestinians7. 
73 It would be particularly interesting to evaluate to what degree the perceptions of space of
international representatives working or visiting the region play a role in maintaining
the illusion of a discreet, completed separation between Israelis and Palestinians. This
question is pertinent both at the political level and at the research level. From a political
point  of  view,  it  would  enable  researchers  to  explain  how,  in  spite  of  the  level  of
interconnection between these spaces, the political horizon for the emergence of two
States in two continuous, separated territories, still remains a possible solution in the
eyes of many external observers. At the research level, the study of this question would
enable researchers to rethink the heuristic value of the present compartmentalization
between studies on Israel and on Palestine, a compartmentalization which, in my view,
contributes  to  imprisoning  the  production  of  knowledge,  not  in  distinct  political
positions, but more so in specific perceptions of the separation and conflict resulting
from specific space/time practices. 
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NOTES
*.  This  article  was  written  in  the  framework  of  research  conducted  in  the  working  group
“Approaching the Israeli Palestinian Conflict through cross border mobilities” financed by the
European network,  Ramses².  In order to guard the anonymity of  the people cited,  all  names
appearing in this text are pseudonyms.
1.  The term “security barrier” (gader bitahon) is, together with the term “separation barrier” (
gader hafrada), one of the terms used by Israelis to designate this separation entity. In this article,
I  shall  use  alternatively  the  terms  “barrier”  and  “wall”  since  this  construction  consists,
depending on the location, of a network of concrete walls or electronic fences, and patrol routes.
 
2.  I use the term “Palestinians of Israel” to designate the Palestinian populations who remained
within  Israeli  borders  following  the  first  Israeli-Arab  war  (1947-1948).  These  populations
acquired Israeli citizenship at the beginning of the 1950s. I use this term because it highlights the
common history between this population and that of the Occupied Territories. It also takes into
account the familial, social and economic ties that persist between these populations till today
(Forte  2001,  Marteu 2009,  Parizot  2001,  2006,  2008).  The term “Israeli  Arabs,”  as  opposed to
“Palestinians” (which designates the populations of the occupied Territories) is problematic in
the  sense  that  not  only  is  it  an  Israeli  term  (‘arviei  Israel),  but  also  because  it  introduces  a
sociological and political break between these two populations (Sa’di 2000). 
3.  A  recent  ruling  by  the  Israeli  Supreme  Court  ordered  the  army  to  open  this  highway
beginning May 2010 (Levinson 2010). 
4.  “The built Jewish area in the West Bank is 1.7 percent of the total land, while the community
areas are four times that size.  An additional  35.1 percent (nearly 500,000 acres)  has been put
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  regional  councils.  Thus,  the  settlements  directly  control  41.9
percent of the West Bank.” (Handel 2009, 202-203).
Temporalities and perceptions of the separation between Israelis and Palestin...
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 20 | 2009
25
5.  See report by the Machsom Watch. 
http://www.machsomwatch.org/en/reports/checkpoints/14/04/2008/ %
5Bfield_daily_time_of_day-formatted %5D/4785 
posted on April 13, 2008, consulted on April 20, 2008. 
6.  I owe this metaphor to Delphine Mercier (CEMCA, CNRS)
7.  Of  course,  one  should  take  into  consideration  the  statutory  inequalities  between
internationals. Diplomats and authorized journalists can circulate more or less freely throughout
the whole Israeli-Palestinian space, including the Gaza Strip. Conversely, given recent hardening
of visas allocation procedures by the Israeli Authorities, local and international NGO employees
have had to restrict their movement to the sole Palestinian enclaves (see Hass 2010).
ABSTRACTS
The Israeli separation policy that has been implemented since the early 1990s has not divided
territorially Israelis and Palestinians. Rather, it has reorganized their trajectories and submitted
these  two  populations  to  distinct  time  regimes.  Through  an  ethnographic  study  of  spatial
practices of Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the West Bank, this
article shows to what extent these time regimes have contributed to shape distinct perceptions
of space among these groups. Through a process of foliation (feuilletage), these space construct
are superposed as many anthropological  space/times within a same place or along the same
paths. This foliation process underscores that the separation regime does not merely reinforce
the  gaps  between Israelis  and  Palestinians  by  creating  asymmetrical  use  and  perceptions  of
space, but that it also strengthen or introduce divisions within these populations. Furthermore,
the study of subjectivities reveals the processes by which these actors contribute to construct
discontinuity  and  distinction  within  their  respective  spaces  while  they  remain  in  a  highly
interconnected context. Finally, this foliation process is significant as it leads to reconsider the
conditions within which are constructed representations, discourses and analysis of the Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict.  Through  their  daily  practices,  Israelis,  Palestinians  and  internationals
elaborate and construct radically different perceptions of the limits, the Other and the conflict as
these construct result from specific time/space experiences.
La politique de séparation mise en place par Israël depuis les années 1990 n’a pas créé de division
territoriale entre Israéliens et Palestiniens. En revanche, elle a réorganisé leurs trajectoires et
assujetti ces populations à des régimes de temps distincts. Partant d’une étude ethnographique
des pratiques spatiales de Juifs israéliens, de Palestiniens de Cisjordanie et de Palestiniens de
citoyenneté israélienne, cet article montre comment ces régimes de temps contribuent à modeler
chez  ces  groupes  des  perceptions  radicalement  distinctes  de  l’espace.  Dans  un  processus  de
feuilletage,  ces constructions se superposent comme autant d’espaces/temps anthropologiques
sur un même lieu ou sur les mêmes parcours. Ce feuilletage montre que le régime de séparation ne
vient donc pas simplement renforcer les écarts entre Israéliens et Palestiniens en créant une
asymétrie au niveau de l’usage et de l’expérience de l’espace/temps, mais qu’il vient également
accentuer  ou  introduire  des  divisions  au  sein  de  ces  populations.  L’étude  des  subjectivités
souligne par ailleurs les processus par lesquels ces acteurs contribuent eux aussi à construire la
discontinuité  et  la  distinction  entre  leurs  espaces  respectifs  dans  un  contexte  où  ils  restent
pourtant fortement interconnectés et  imbriqués.  La mise en perspective de ce feuilletage est
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enfin significative dans la mesure où elle permet de reconsidérer les conditions dans lesquelles se
construisent  les  représentations,  les  discours  et  les  analyses  du  conflit  israélo-palestinien.  À
travers leurs pratiques quotidiennes, les Israéliens, les Palestiniens, ainsi que les acteurs et les
observateurs internationaux élaborent et construisent des perceptions des limites, de l’Autre et
du  conflit  radicalement  décalées,  dans  la  mesure  où  celles-ci  sont  conditionnées  par  des
expériences spécifiques de l’espace/temps.
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